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Introduction
The variance of wages across individuals is a summary statistic that
means many things. Wage variance is an indicator of income inequality:
high variance suggests high income inequality. But the “wage structure” of
an economy—or the mean and the variance of wages—is also an indicator
of the degree to which some individuals invest in human capital, the degree
to which they work hard in response to incentives, the rates of return to 
human capital investments, and institutional factors that shape wage de-
termination. Thus far, economists have had data on the distribution of 
wages across individuals in the economy, but not on the distribution of wages
across individuals within ﬁrms. Now with new matched employer-employee
data sets, we can look at the structure of wages within ﬁrms as well as across
ﬁrms. New questions can be raised and addressed empirically.
Every country has wage variation across individuals. Not all workers
earn the same amount. Think about the following questions:
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seminars.1. Is there wage variance because workers ﬁnd themselves in diﬀerent
ﬁrms, some of which are high-wage ﬁrms, while other ﬁrms are low-wage
ﬁrms? That is, is there a high variance of mean wages across ﬁrms, or are
mean wages of ﬁrms quite similar across ﬁrms?
2. Is there wage variance across individuals because within every ﬁrm,
some workers are highly paid and others are less well paid?
3. Do all ﬁrms have the same wage structure, or are wage structures
widely varying across ﬁrms? That is, do some ﬁrms have a wage structure
that is very compressed—paying low- and high-wage workers very similar
wages—while other ﬁrms have a very dispersed or high-variance structure
of wages within the ﬁrm? If some wage structures within ﬁrms are more
compressed than others, what factors account for diﬀerences across ﬁrms?
Do most ﬁrms specialize in a narrow range of jobs, so the structure of pay
looks very diﬀerent across ﬁrms? Does the boundary of the ﬁrm matter?
When there is pay compression, does it result in losses of the most able
workers or of the retention of the least able?
4. The distribution of income is always skewed across individuals within
a country—it has a long upper tail. Is this because salaries within ﬁrms are
skewed, or does the skewness result from a few ﬁrms paying high wage
levels? Skewness is relevant in the context of tournament theory, which sug-
gests that there should be skewness within ﬁrms because salary jumps at
the higher end of the skill hierarchy are greater than salary jumps at the
lower end of the hierarchy as a reward for eﬀort.
We can ask similar questions about wage growth rates, or pay raises, for
individuals:
1. Are average pay raises very diﬀerent across ﬁrms so that ﬁnding em-
ployment in a high-growth ﬁrm insures a person of high wage growth?
2. Are pay raises uniform within ﬁrms, or are some workers treated very
diﬀerently from others? It is possible that workers’ raises within ﬁrms are
nearly identical—moving lockstep across workers when conditions change
for the ﬁrm—so that diﬀerences in wage growth across workers in the econ-
omy is accounted for primarily by ﬁrm diﬀerences in mean growth rates. It
is also possible that mean wage growth rates are very similar across ﬁrms,
but that signiﬁcant within-ﬁrm variation produces the economy’s variation
in wage growth rates.
Answers to these questions are revealing. For example, if wage levels are
very diﬀerent across ﬁrms, then ﬁrms must be sorting workers based on in-
dividual workers’ levels of human capital or their eﬀort levels, and, more-
over, workers can improve their pay only by moving across ﬁrms. On the
other hand, if mean wages are very similar across ﬁrms but wage variance
is high within ﬁrms, then human capital development within ﬁrms and pro-
motions within ﬁrms are predominant features of the labor market. Fur-
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ﬁrm, then eﬀort and skills are being heavily rewarded within ﬁrms.
Finally, do the answers to these questions vary across countries? Do
wage structures appear to vary signiﬁcantly across countries as a function
of diﬀerent institutions or human capital? Ultimately, the answers might
reﬂect diﬀerence sources of productivity in ﬁrms. So do the patterns help
explain diﬀerences in productivity across countries?
Until very recently, it would be impossible to answer these questions 
because the answers would require data on all of the workers in a ﬁrm for
a large number of ﬁrms. Now this required data is available from a num-
ber of diﬀerent countries to answer many of these questions and more. The 
employer-employee matched data sets, from many European countries 
and from the United States, either contain information on nearly all work-
ers and ﬁrms in that country or information on all workers within a large
subset of ﬁrms. As a result, it is possible to examine the worker’s position
in the context of his or her entire ﬁrm. Additionally, the existence of data
for a large number of ﬁrms permits new questions, like those listed in the
preceding, to be addressed.
This is not the ﬁrst time such questions have been asked. The ﬁrst eco-
nomics paper on this subject is Lazear (1992). That study made use of a
complete data set on one large ﬁrm and studied both wages and mobility.
The work was followed by similar papers by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom
(1994a,b). They studied a diﬀerent company and also examined the struc-
ture of promotion, ports of entry, and wages. The advantage of those
analyses is that it is possible to examine the entire ﬁrm, thereby analyzing
promotion paths, determinants and consequences, as well as wage deter-
mination and structure. The disadvantage is that because the studies only
cover two diﬀerent ﬁrms, it is diﬃcult to generalize the results, and not all
results are consistent across papers.
It is important, therefore, to have data not only on entire ﬁrms and all
workers in them, but also on a large number of ﬁrms so that results can be
generalized. The authors in this book have used the new style of data to ask
and answer questions that cannot be answered with traditional data sets.
For example, many of these data sets can be used to calculate returns to ex-
perience and tenure and can perhaps do it better because of their richness.
In this book, we have steered away from some questions because they are
addressed well by traditional individual-level panel data sets that use the
individual as the unit of analysis and sample randomly from a large popu-
lation. Those data sets have very few observations from the same ﬁrm and,
in most cases, the identity of the ﬁrm is unknown. As a consequence, nei-
ther a ﬁrm’s wage structure nor its hiring and promotion patterns can be
gleaned from traditional data. Our focus is on exactly the questions that
could not be answered historically using individual panel data.
In this introduction, we set out to do two things. First, we use the data
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about ﬁrm wage structure, promotion, hiring, and mobility patterns to an-
swer the questions posed in the preceding and more. Second, because this
kind of analysis is new and because we are covering a large number of
countries and studies in this introduction, we aim to raise as many ques-
tions as we provide answers. But the questions themselves may be useful, if
for no other reason than they cast light on the kinds of issues that can be
addressed with this type of data.
This study is based on the extensive empirical work done by all of the
country-speciﬁc authors in this book. The authors provided to us statistics
that they each constructed to be as comparable as possible across countries
so that we might identify patterns across countries (though diﬀerences in
the underlying data sets do not make these statistics perfectly comparable,
as described in the following). However, in this introduction, we make no
attempt to delve deeply into the sources of diﬀerences across countries.
The individual country chapters describe the primary institutional features
of the countries and the macroeconomic conditions. In addition, the coun-
try chapter authors provide much greater expertise and analysis of data
that is speciﬁc to the countries (such as the occupational structures of ﬁrms
or productivity information). After the following broad description of the
data, we then look at the structure of wage levels and at alternative models
of interpreting these structures. After that, we turn to wage growth rates
and mobility.
The Data
The data come from all of the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Fin-
land, Norway, Sweden) and from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, as well as the United States. The sampling frames are diﬀer-
ent across countries. In a broad fashion, we can group the data of the coun-
tries into ﬁve basic sampling schemes, as shown in table I.1. The sequence
of data is as follows. At the top of the list are the country data sets that
cover most of the populations, and then descending in the table are data
sets that cover subsets of the population covered in the data. For example,
at the top of the list are Denmark, Norway, and the United States because
they have data on all workers in all ﬁrms in the economy (though for a sub-
set of states in the United States). Next, Finland, Sweden, and Belgium
have data on all workers in large ﬁrms; Germany and Norway (using more
matched data) have data on all workers in manufacturing. Italy and France
cover all ﬁrms, but within ﬁrms they have only a sample of workers, not
data on every worker.1 Finally, additional analysis is done for Norway 
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1. Italy has a 1/90 sample within ﬁrms, so the Italian authors provide information on syn-
thetic ﬁrms by taking data from similar industries and locations and blending them into cells,
which they treat as ﬁrms. France has a 1/25 sample, so we correct statistics for this sampling.and Sweden for white- and blue-collar workers because additional detailed
matched data is available for these groups.
Table I.1 also provides a brief summary of the key wage variables and the
age or time restrictions on the data, but for more detailed analysis of the
country-speciﬁc diﬀerences, see appendix table I.A.1. Inevitably, variables
diﬀer, as in how wages are measured (with or without bonuses, hourly or
salary, monthly or annual), and these diﬀerences naturally enter the statis-
tical comparisons that we make. In addition to the descriptions in appen-
dix table I.A.1, each chapter describes its own data in detail.
Appendix tables I.A.2 and I.A.3 contain basic descriptive statistics for
all the countries for the key variables that are used in the following ﬁgures.
The key to constituting an employer-employee matched data set is that
there is substantial information on a cross section of workers within each
ﬁrm spanning many ﬁrms. This is essential to drawing inferences about
wage structure, worker mobility, and promotion and hiring patterns within
and across ﬁrms.
Wage Structure, Raises, and Mobility: Introduction 5
Table I.1 Country classiﬁcations by type of data
Data type Country details
All private ﬁrms, all  United States—all ﬁrms, all employees, wages plus bonuses, 
employees quarterly data annualized
Denmark—all ﬁrms, all employees, wages plus bonuses, annual
(November)
The Netherlands—all ﬁrms (including nonproﬁt, government), 
all employees, wage plus bonuses, annual (September)
Firms in employer  Finland—employer association (TT; large ﬁrms), all employees,
associations, all  wages plus bonuses, annual
employees Belgium—random sample of ﬁrms, all employees, 1995, wages
plus bonuses, annual
Sweden (plants)—all industries, plants only, all employees, annual
Employer associations,  Germany—manufacturing and services (IAB; large ﬁrms), plants
some industries, all  only, top-coded wages are input, annual (June)
employees Norway—heavy manufacturing (industry 38), all employees
All private ﬁrms,  Italy—private sector, large employers, permanent employees, 1/90
sample of employees sample of workers, annual (May)
France—all ﬁrms, 1/25 sample of workers in ﬁrms, wages plus
bonuses
Firms in employer  Norway—white-collar, employer association (NHO), 
associations, all  manufacturing and services (more manufacturing), all 
employees, but only  employees, but only employees, wage plus bonuses
white- or blue-collar Sweden (ﬁrm)—white-collar, employer association (SAF); blue-
collar, employer association (SAF)
Note: TT   Confederation of Finnish Industry;
IAB   Institute for Employment Research;
NHO   Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry; and
SAF   Swedish Employer’s Federation.Primary Findings
The main ﬁnding is that countries are remarkably similar in their struc-
tures of wage levels and of wage changes. Given the similarity of the wage
structures across countries, we reach some general conclusions based on
the data. The discussion section at the end of the chapter introduces more
policy conclusions on why these empirical regularities matter.
1. There is a striking amount of wage variation within ﬁrms: the within
ﬁrm wage variation is about 60 to 80 percent of the wage dispersion across
all individuals in the economy. There is also variation across ﬁrms in the
mean wages they pay: the standard deviation of the mean wages of ﬁrms is
about 60 percent of the standard deviation across all individuals. However,
when we scale the mean wages ﬁrms pay relative to the average worker’s
wage in the economy, one standard deviation in ﬁrm means is only 15 to 20
percent of the average wage: ﬁrms don’t diﬀer that much in what they pay.
Overall, despite very diﬀerent labor institutions across countries, the evi-
dence favoring high within-ﬁrm wage dispersion appears across countries.
2. The across- (or between-) ﬁrm diﬀerences in wages appears to be
growing over time. That is, for a signiﬁcant number of countries, the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects are explaining a larger percent of the distribution of
wages across ﬁrms. This may be because ﬁrms are increasingly segregated
according to the skills that they require. Or it may be that ﬁrms that pay
high-level eﬃciency wages (in exchange for skills or low turnover) are in-
creasingly diverging from those that are pushed to low-level market clear-
ing wages in lower-skilled or highly competitive industries. Or it may also
reﬂect the boundaries of the ﬁrm associated with outsourcing: the high-
skill ﬁrms now use more outsourcing for their low-skill jobs.
3. With respect to wage growth, although ﬁrms diﬀer in the average
raises they give in a particular year, ﬁrms do not tie all workers to the same
percentage point raise within the ﬁrm. The standard deviation of raises
within ﬁrm is between 10 and 20 percentage points, even when the average
wage increase for the ﬁrm is close to zero. This is most consistent with the
view that ﬁrms respond to outside pressure (either market or governmen-
tal) to raise workers’ wages commensurate with some occupational or skill
standard; ﬁrms are not raising all workers’ wages equally in response to the
conditions within the ﬁrm.
4. Mobility levels diﬀer across countries, but even here, mobility pat-
terns seem relatively consistent. High-wage ﬁrms have low turnover. Large
ﬁrms are higher wage and lower entry.
Decomposing Wage Variance
Return to the question raised at the outset, how much do ﬁrms diﬀer?
Figure I.1 depicts the two extremes views of the variance of wage levels
6 Edward P. Lazear and Kathryn L. Shawwithin and across ﬁrms. In panel A of ﬁgure I.1, all ﬁrms are identical, so
the variance of wages for each ﬁrm is the same as the variance of wages for
the country. At the other extreme, in panel B of ﬁgure I.1, all ﬁrms diﬀer,
so the variance of wages within ﬁrms is very narrow, and the variance of
wages for the country arises from diﬀerences in the variance of mean wages
across ﬁrms.
The diﬀerent sources of wage variation in ﬁgure I.1 can be decomposed
more systematically, which is useful later in interpreting the sources of
wage variation. Decompose the variance of wages across individuals into
the contribution of ﬁrms:
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Fig. I.1 Wage distributions within and between ﬁrms: A, All ﬁrms have identical
wage distributions: Firms have the same within-ﬁrm wage variation and no between-
ﬁrm variation. The probability density function for the country is the same as that
for the median ﬁrm and extreme ﬁrms. B, All ﬁrms have similar within-ﬁrm wage
distributions and different between-ﬁrm wage distributions.where pj is the share of workers in the economy who are working in ﬁrm j,
 j
2 is the variance of wages in ﬁrm j, w  j is the mean wage for ﬁrm j (across
its workers), w  
. is the mean wage for the entire economy (across its workers
and ﬁrms). Thus, the variance of wages for the economy will be high if (1)
mean wages diﬀer across ﬁrms, so |w  j – w  
.| is large (as in panel B of ﬁgure
I.1) or if (2) the within-ﬁrm variance of wages,  j
2, is large (as in panel A of
ﬁgure I.1), or if both are true (not drawn in a ﬁgure).
The wage structure underlying ﬁgure I.1 assumes that ﬁrms have identi-
cal wage variance within each ﬁrm. Figure I.2 depicts a more likely struc-
ture. In that ﬁgure, the variance of wages is not only diﬀerent across ﬁrms,
but also rises with the mean wage of the ﬁrm. There are numerous reasons
for the positive correlation between wage level and variance, such as rising
levels of human capital in ﬁrms, that are introduced later.
The Structure of Wages: Wage Levels
To get started, let us point out some initial observations. There are two
(among many) ways in which data have been displayed by the authors of
this book. The ﬁrst is to use the individual as the unit of analysis. The sec-
ond, and way most unique to this structure, is to use the ﬁrm as the unit of
analysis. Table I.A1 does the comparison. Here, the average level of wages,
the standard deviations, and 90th and 10th percentile are displayed. The
units are own-country currencies, so comparisons cannot be made across
countries without conversions to ratios or other unit-free numbers. The
mean level of average wages in the ﬁrm-based data is always lower than that
of the mean for the individual-based data, although there is some variation
in ratios across countries (see tables in the country chapters). This reﬂects
8 Edward P. Lazear and Kathryn L. Shaw
Fig. I.2 Positive correlation in within-ﬁrm mean wages and varianceweighting. If all ﬁrms were of identical size, then the ﬁrm average would
equal the individual average. The fact that the ﬁrm mean is below the indi-
vidual mean implies that the largest ﬁrms, which account for dispropor-
tionately more workers, have higher average wages than the smaller ﬁrms.
The ﬁrm average, which does not weight by ﬁrm size, puts relatively more
emphasis on the small ﬁrms and pulls the average wage down. That ﬁrm
size and average wage are correlated is not a new result (Brown and Medoﬀ
1989; Fox 2007).
The key question raised in the preceding is, how does the variation in
wages within and across ﬁrms contribute to the variation in wages for the
country? First, if all ﬁrms were alike, then their wage distributions would
be identical to the distribution for the country as a whole as shown in panel
A of ﬁgure I.1. At the other extreme, ﬁrms might treat their workers very
similarly within the ﬁrm, and the variation in wages throughout the coun-
try could be accounted for by diﬀerences in the mean value of wages be-
tween ﬁrms, as shown in panel B of ﬁgure I.1.
We begin by displaying wage distributions for some typical countries.
Consider the patterns illustrated by Norway, France, and Denmark (as
typical countries) in ﬁgure I.3. In ﬁgure I.3, there are wage distributions
displayed for three typical ﬁrms. The Low Wage Below 10th percentile dis-
tribution represents the wage distribution for ﬁrms in the sample that have
mean wages below the 10th percentile of the wage distribution of ﬁrms’
mean wages.2The other two ﬁrm types are the ﬁrms Around Median Wage
(in the 45th to 55th percentile of the ﬁrm mean wage distribution) and the
High Wage Above 90th percentile. The bold line is the distribution for all
individuals in the data.
Norway’s situation is typical and is a compromise between panels A and
B of ﬁgure I.1. Firms have very considerable wage dispersion within them,
though not as high as the wage dispersion across all individuals in the econ-
omy. The typical ﬁrm is not the almost spiked distribution as shown in
panel B of ﬁgure I.1. However, the wage distribution for the typical ﬁrm
that is below the 10th percentile is tighter than that for the country as a
whole. The same is true for the wage distribution of the typical ﬁrm around
the median and for the ﬁrm with mean wages in the top 10 percent of
ﬁrms.3 While wage dispersion within ﬁrms is very high, ﬁrms have many
diﬀerent jobs within the ﬁrm. As a result of diﬀerences in the means, the
wage distributions of high-wage and low-wage ﬁrms are by and large dis-
joint. At the mean, some of these ﬁrms have low pay, low skill; some have
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2. In these ﬁgures, each distribution is a graph of the normal distribution given the mean
wage and standard deviation for that subsample.
3. The typical ﬁrm was constructed by averaging the mean log wage and the within-ﬁrm
standard deviation of log wages for ﬁrms in the 0 to 10th percentile, the 45th to 55th per-
centile, and the 90th and above percentile. The distributions were constructed assuming that
wages are distributed log normally.high pay, high skill (or high variance). But the high variance of wages
within ﬁrms causes wage distributions of ﬁrms with very diﬀerent means to
overlap.
Figures I.4 through I.6 summarize these primary results across countries
on the structure of wages. Figure I.4 graphs the ratio of the average of the
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B
Fig. I.3 Wage distributions for some typical countries: A, Norway 1997; B, France
1996; C, Denmark 2000
Notes: Below 10 refers to the subsample of ﬁrms for which each ﬁrm has its mean wage of the
ﬁrm below the 10th percentile of the mean wages of all ﬁrms. Near 50 refers to the subsample
of ﬁrms for which each ﬁrm has its mean wage of the ﬁrm near the 50th percentile of the mean
wages of all ﬁrms. Above 90 refers to the subsample of ﬁrms for which each ﬁrm has its mean
wage of the ﬁrm above the 90th percentile of the mean wages of all ﬁrms. All refers to all ﬁrms.within-ﬁrm standard deviation of wages divided by the country’s standard
deviation of wages. Figure I.4 shows that, on average, the dispersion of
wages within ﬁrms is about 60 percent to 80 percent of the total wage dis-
persion for the country (across individuals). Figure I.5 graphs the ratio of
the standard deviation of the mean wages of the ﬁrms divided by the coun-
try’s mean wage. By this measure, it appears that ﬁrms don’t diﬀer much in
their mean wages—the standard deviation is only 10 percent to 20 percent
of the average wage for the country. However, the dispersion of mean wages
for ﬁrms is high relative to the overall dispersion of means: the standard de-
viation of mean wages of the ﬁrms is about 60 percent of the total wage dis-
persion for the country (ﬁgure I.6).
Thus, these ﬁgures show that—across all countries—the structure of
wages is a compromise between panels A and B of ﬁgure I.1. There is very
high wage dispersion within ﬁrms. But the mean wages of ﬁrms also diﬀer
considerably: there are high-wage ﬁrms and there are low-wage ﬁrms. The
ﬁgure for Norway, ﬁgure I.3, is very representative of the structure of wages
across countries.
What is especially striking about these results is that it is true across all
countries.4 Figure I.7 expands upon these two points by providing the av-
erage coeﬃcients of variation for within ﬁrms across all countries. Coun-
tries are remarkably similar: for the average ﬁrm, the standard deviation 
of wages is about 25 percent of the mean wage. For example, Finland has
Wage Structure, Raises, and Mobility: Introduction 11
4. The low number belongs to Italy and the Italian data contain synthetic ﬁrms that are
closer to a random draw from the overall population. This reduces reported dispersion below























































































































































































































































































































































































































































sconsiderably diﬀerent ﬁrms in that the ﬁrms with larger internal wage dis-
persion have coeﬃcients of variation equal to about .35, whereas those
with little internal wage dispersion have coeﬃcients of around .15. But the
average is around .25, which is about the same value as the average value
for almost all countries. The average ﬁrm across Europe has a standard de-
viation of wages that is about one-fourth the wage of that ﬁrm. This is
slightly higher in some countries and slightly lower in others, but the vari-
ation is small relative to the within-country diﬀerences in coeﬃcients of
variation for wages. Whether this reﬂects some kind of universal constant
remains to be determined.
Thus, despite diﬀerent labor market institutions, countries do not diﬀer
dramatically in their wage patterns. Does it imply that there is a typical skill
distribution for all countries and these are reﬂected in the coeﬃcient of
variation that is seen for the country as a whole? Or does it imply that wage
policies vary across ﬁrms, but tend to average out at the country level be-
cause ﬁrms adopt the same distribution of wage polices irrespective of
country? These questions remain open ones, but we turn to themes that de-
scribe the wage patterns.
The Structure of Wages: Some Themes
What do these results tell us about our basic models of the determina-
tion of wages and productivity across workers? To answer, we begin by
identifying three diﬀerent models of wage setting that permeate the litera-
ture. Given these models, we then ask, why do workers diﬀer within ﬁrms,
and why do ﬁrms diﬀer?
The best known theory of wage setting is human capital theory, which
states in its most basic form that workers are paid on the basis of their gen-
eral skills and that these skills can be measured as a scaler, meaning that
there is one skill, and everything can be expressed in eﬃciency units of that
skill. The wage equation for individual wages is:
(2) wijt    0    1 Educijt    2 Experijt,
where wages for person i in ﬁrm j at time t are a function of his or her edu-
cation and experience. Were human capital the only determinant of wages,
then it would not matter at all in which ﬁrm a worker ﬁnds him- or herself.
The competitive labor market would require that all ﬁrms pay the worker
exactly the same thing, irrespective of the ﬁrm in which he or she works.
Otherwise, other ﬁrms could easily steal him or her away by paying a
slightly higher wage and capturing the proﬁts. This is most easily described
as a spot market view of the labor market, where competition forces work-
ers to be paid on the basis of the productivity, which is in turn reﬂected per-
fectly in measurable skills. The  1 and  2 in equation (2) measure the rates
of return to skills.
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diﬀer within or across ﬁrms because ﬁrms are irrelevant. Firms matter if we
add a model of worker sorting across ﬁrms and thus of diﬀerences in the
underlying production functions of ﬁrms. Table I.2 lays out the alterna-
tives. In column (1), there is large wage dispersion within ﬁrms, and all
ﬁrms are identical (mimicking panel A of ﬁgure I.1). There is high wage
dispersion within ﬁrms if the within-ﬁrm production function requires a
combination of workers with diﬀerent skills to optimally produce output.
The appropriate model of the ﬁrm would be one in which workers within
the ﬁrm have complementary skills, as in models of teamwork or of hier-
archy.5 In contrast, if ﬁrms diﬀer by occupation, then workers are likely 
to be sorted by occupation or skill: the within-ﬁrm wage dispersion is low,
but there are large diﬀerences in mean wages across ﬁrms (as in column [2]
of table I.2). Last, it is likely that mean wages and the variance of wages are
positively correlated: high-human-capital ﬁrms (like law ﬁrms or large busi-
nesses) are more likely to have teams or hierarchies that produce higher
wage variance than low-wage, low-human-capital ﬁrms. A law ﬁrm will
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5. See Lazear (1999) for a model of complementary team workers and Hubbard (2000) for
a model of complementary workers within a hierarchy.
Table I.2 Models of wage setting that would produce ﬁgures I.1
Wages vary within ﬁrms:  Wages vary across ﬁrms:
Broad dispersion of skill or Workers sort into ﬁrms based 
eﬀort within the ﬁrm. on their skill or eﬀort levels.
Panel A of ﬁgure I.1:  Panel B of ﬁgure I.1: 
All ﬁrms alike, but high  All workers paid same within ﬁrm;
within-ﬁrm wage dispersion  Panel ﬁrms diﬀer in mean wages.
w  j   w  
.;  w  
l   0 w  j   w  
.;  w  
l   0;  wl, low;
Wage setting based on  All ﬁrms have a broad distribution  Wage structures diﬀer across ﬁrms 
occupation (human  of occupations within the ﬁrm  because there is one occupation per
capital skills) (same distribution of human  ﬁrm. Workers sort into ﬁrms by 
capital). occupation or by skill level.
Wage setting based  Workers identical skills; tourna- Workers sort across ﬁrms 
on wage policy aimed  ment or piece rates create pay  according to preferences for piece 
incentive pay (e.g., piece  dispersion. Or workers diﬀer in  rate pay. Narrow wage dispersion 
rates or tournaments) or  ambition, but distribution of types  implies no tournaments; there is 
at wage compression identical in every ﬁrm. pay compression within the ﬁrm.
Institutional wage setting  All ﬁrms have a broad distribution  Wage structures diﬀer across 
(such as unions) for  of occupations or job titles on  because workers sort by ﬁrms
sharing rents between  which wages are based, or a steep  occupation, or because pay is a 
worker and ﬁrm seniority structure on which wages  function of the proﬁtability of 
are based. the ﬁrm.have high-wage lawyers and lower-wage assistants and janitors, but a
janitorial service ﬁrm will have few high-paid managers. This theoretical
positive correlation between the mean wage and variance is displayed in
ﬁgure I.2.
An alternative model of wage setting, a purely institutional theory of
wage determination, also has the implication that a worker’s wage is in-
dependent of the ﬁrm in which he or she is employed. Suppose that wages
were set by a central authority and the authority set the wage based on the
worker’s occupational title, where his or her occupational title was deter-
mined by his or her worker characteristics. For example, a particular level
of experience and educational background could be used to determine oc-
cupational status using some index, such as
(3) wijt    0   b Educijt   c Experijt.
Although the index might look similar to a human capital wage function,
there need be no direct relation of the coeﬃcients b and c to anything hav-
ing to do with productivity. The central authority, such as a union, might
simply determine that the selected weights b and c are appropriate in some
sense, based on equity or any other consideration. In the institutional
model, the sharing of rents between the worker and ﬁrm is determined by
institutional rules (such as those set by union negotiations).
As in the human capital model, the institutional model predicts wage
dispersion within ﬁrms if ﬁrms contain many occupations, or, alternatively,
predicts very diﬀerent mean wages across ﬁrms if ﬁrms are organized by
occupation or industry (comparing the predictions of columns [1] and [2]
of row [2] in table I.2). The institutional model diﬀers from the human cap-
ital model in that the underlying model of wage setting is quite diﬀerent de-
spite similar predictions. In an institutional model of wage setting, pay dis-
persion may arise within the ﬁrm if pay rises with seniority, even if all
workers have the same level of human capital. Alternatively, workers may
have very diﬀerent levels of human capital, but the same wages within the
ﬁrm, if unions compress all wages to be equal. Firm proﬁtability also en-
ters. If negotiated pay is a function of the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm, there will
be little wage dispersion within the ﬁrm, but very diﬀerent mean wages
across ﬁrms as a function of proﬁts. In this case, “a rising tide lifts all
boats”: rising proﬁts raise the pay for all workers in the ﬁrm, and there is
no wage dispersion within the ﬁrm.
Finally, ﬁrms can have “wage policies” that are aimed at incentives for
eﬀort or at optimal sorting and that thereby aﬀect wage dispersion. Most
wage policies that are aimed at pay for performance will increase wage dis-
persion within ﬁrms. That is true of piece-rate policies or of implicit con-
tract theories that create divergence between wages and productivity. Con-
sider ﬁrst the piece-rate model, in which a ﬁrm pays a piece rate that is
given by
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The higher is b, the greater is the amount of eﬀort that a worker puts into
a job.6 Thus, if workers diﬀer in skills or in eﬀort, then piece-rate pay ac-
centuates the variance of pay within ﬁrms. Similarly, tournament models
increase within-ﬁrm pay variance as well. Tournament models (Lazear and
Rosen 1981), which are most applicable to white-collar workers, suggest
that wage structures within ﬁrms serve incentive purposes and that it is the
hierarchical structure of accelerating wages at each level, rather than the
current wage, that determines the strength of the incentives. In tournament
theories, workers at higher levels of the ﬁrm’s hierarchy receive pay that has
impacts on those below them. Lower-level workers want to become higher-
level workers, and their desire to climb the internal job ladder depends on
the raise that workers receive when they are promoted (nonmonetary as
well as monetary). Because the optimal size of the raise depends on inter-
nal conditions like the riskiness of the activity and the shape of the ﬁrm’s
hierarchy and the ﬁrm’s production function, tournament theory suggests
that workers will be treated diﬀerently in diﬀerent types of ﬁrms, even when
the workers have the same basic characteristics. Overall, tournaments in-
crease pay dispersion within ﬁrms, holding ﬁxed the level of human capital.
Wage policies, such as forms of incentive pay, can also cause striking
diﬀerences in mean wages across ﬁrms due to worker sorting.7 Firms oﬀer-
ing incentive pay are also the high-wage, high-eﬀort ﬁrms. Those ﬁrms
without incentive pay are low wage, low eﬀort, and thus there is variance
of mean wages across ﬁrms when workers preferring the high eﬀort ﬁrm
sort to those and others do not (as summarized in column [2] of table I.2).
These diﬀerences in mean wages and incentives reﬂect diﬀerences in the
production environment that determines the value of incentive pay.
In sum, these models suggest at least two possible reasons why ﬁrms
might have signiﬁcant within-ﬁrm variation in wages. First, and most ob-
vious, is that workers are diﬀerent. The workers that ﬁrms employ within
are not identical, and, as a result, wages reﬂect the skill heterogeneity of 
the workers within the ﬁrm. Those wages might be determined completely
externally, either by a competitive labor market process, in the extreme by
a spot market, or by a centralized wage setter, like a government or tripar-
tite (labor, management, government) body. If worker skills are diﬀerent
within ﬁrms and wages are set externally, then wages within ﬁrms will re-
ﬂect the underlying skill distributions within them.
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6. The worker maximizes a   b (output) – C(output), where C(output) is the eﬀort cost of
producing a given output level and where C  0. The ﬁrst order condition is C (output)   b.
Because C  0, increasing b increases the amount of eﬀort.
7. For example, see McLeod and Malcolmson (1989) and Stole and Zweibel (1996) for
models of bargaining theories, where the outside alternatives as well as the worker’s value to
the ﬁrm aﬀect the actual wage level, and thus create diﬀerences in what ﬁrms pay.Alternatively, the wage variance within the ﬁrm might reﬂect wage pol-
icy, not skill heterogeneity. Even if all workers were identical ex ante, a wage
policy could result in paying diﬀerent wages to diﬀerent people. This hap-
pens in a tournament, for example, where pay is more dispersed than ex
ante talent and where the relation of pay to ex post output is positive, but
with a correlation far from 1. In the other direction is that wages may be
more compressed than ex ante ability. Pay compression might simply re-
ﬂect wage policy of the ﬁrm. It is well known, for example, that certain in-
stitutions, like labor unions, compress wages relative to nonunion ﬁrms. It
is also possible that wage setting in a centralized or negotiated environment
might result in wage compression that brings up the wages of the least
skilled and cuts the wages of the most skilled. There is no reason why this
pattern would necessarily be uniform across ﬁrms, industries, or occupa-
tions. Thus, pay policy is another variable that lies behind the within-ﬁrm
wage distribution.
It is key to try to disentangle these alternative explanations. That takes us
beyond this introductory analysis, but in the next sections, we will describe
evidence that speaks to these diﬀerences and will try to suggest additional
questions or lines of research that might assist in obtaining answers.
The Structure of Wages: Disentangling the Themes
The data show that across all countries there is very signiﬁcant wage dis-
persion within ﬁrms. However, ﬁrms are diﬀerent: mean wages vary con-
siderably.
We cannot identify whether the wage dispersion within ﬁrms is due to
the heterogeneity of skills within ﬁrms or due to wage policies of incentive
pay that increase pay variance. However, some forms of wage policies can
be rejected. We have two pieces of evidence rejecting the possibility that
ﬁrms compress pay within the ﬁrm (relative to market-level wage rates).
The ﬁrst is the correlation between ﬁrms’ mean wages and ﬁrms’ spread in
wages within each ﬁrm. Second is the correlation between the wage spread
in the ﬁrm and worker mobility.
Wage Level and Wage Variance
There is a positive correlation between the log wage and the within-ﬁrm
variance of the log wage (ﬁgure I.8).The correlation ranges between .1 and
.3 across countries. There are a number of interpretations of this ﬁnding.
Two are worth mentioning. The ﬁrst is causal; the second is statistical.
One causal explanation is the human capital story: ﬁrms that have high
levels of human capital are more likely to have a high within-ﬁrm variance
of human capital. The second causal explanation is more subtle, regarding
wage policy. Apparently, ﬁrms are rejecting policies of pay compression in
favor of policies of within-ﬁrm incentives and human capital growth. A









































































































)policy of pay compression—or egalitarian pay and compressed incen-
tives—could arise in large ﬁrms with high mean wages. Such a policy of
pay compression could increase performance if it enhances teamwork and
workers are very complementary (or have high amounts of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
human capital). However, such a policy could be harmful to productiv-
ity—it would induce adverse sorting and adverse incentives: the top per-
formers would sort out of the ﬁrm and would work less hard if the ﬁrm
lacks tournaments or piece-rate pay.8 The data rejects pay compression:
high-wage ﬁrms are also high-incentive, high human capital ﬁrms. In the
next subsection, we provide evidence on mobility that also rejects the pay
compression model.
A second explanation for the correlation between average wage and its
standard deviation is purely statistical. It is well known that the distribu-
tion of wages is positively skewed: there is signiﬁcant positive skew in
worker ability. Suppose that ﬁrms are partitions of the overall income dis-
tribution. A positive correlation between average and standard deviation
of wage would result. For example, suppose that wage distribution is par-
titioned into two ﬁrms: the bottom 50 percent of wage earners work for the
low-wage ﬁrm, and the top 50 percent worked for the high-wage ﬁrm. The
high-wage ﬁrm would have higher variance due to the positive skew of the
overall income distribution. Thus, if there are low- and high-wage ﬁrms
due to people sorting by human capital levels across ﬁrms, the skewness of
the wage distribution will produce a positive correlation between wages
levels and variance.9
Finally, the basic results—of positively correlated mean and wage vari-
ance—rule out the “extreme sorting” of workers into ﬁrms according to ei-
ther their occupation, skill, or eﬀort level. Even within the high-wage ﬁrms,
there are lower-wage workers: high-wage ﬁrms are not just ﬁrms of lawyers
or high-tech programmers. Law ﬁrms must have janitors, but building
cleaning contracting ﬁrms need not have lawyers.
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8. The sorting mechanism is more important at the ﬁrm level than at the country level. Be-
tween country there is less sorting than between ﬁrms within a country. Workers who do not
like pay compression in Sweden might choose to move to Denmark, but less readily than
those at Volvo move to Saab. As a result, the correlation between average wage and variance
in wage might be expected to be stronger within county than between. (It is diﬃcult to com-
pare wages across countries because of exchange rates, purchasing power parity [PPP] issues
of nontradeable goods, etc.)
9. The positive skew could be due to luck or eﬀort, or both. Assume the ﬁrm has a wage pol-
icy of incentive pay. When the ﬁrm gets “lucky,” the incentive pay rewards all those within the
ﬁrm, but it rewards the highest paid the most. An extreme example of this would be stock op-
tions. For example, Microsoft was a high wage and a high wage variance ﬁrm due to options
and incentive pay. When Microsoft got lucky, many within Microsoft did well. Because
greater amounts of stock options and incentives are given out to those at the highest pay lev-
els, there is a positive correlation between pay level and variance. Researchers could examine
the role of luck by looking more closely at the role of individual ﬁxed eﬀects versus ﬁrm eﬀects
in contributing to high variance income.Wage Level and Worker Mobility
A key determinant of whether within-ﬁrm wage variation reﬂects wage
policy or underlying characteristics is the pattern of mobility. For ex-
ample, consider a ﬁrm that has a small standard deviation of the log of
wages. This could reﬂect a policy of pay compression, or it could reﬂect a
homogeneous workforce. If it is pay compression that hurts the top rela-
tive to the bottom, then the top workers should be more likely to leave the
ﬁrm than the bottom workers. If we ﬁnd a pattern where ﬁrms with tight
wage distributions also have disproportionate exit of the highest paid
workers, then the inference that we would draw is that the pay compres-
sion is policy. Conversely, if low-wage workers have their pay increased rel-
ative to the market in such ﬁrms, then they should be less likely to leave.
There would be no reason for top workers to leave disproportionately nor
for bottom workers to stay disproportionately if all were paid their com-
petitive wage.
Figure I.9 provides some evidence. The exit rates of workers who are
highly paid but work in compressed pay ﬁrms are lower than the exit rates
of top workers in noncompressed ﬁrms. If these ﬁndings hold up, they
would suggest that the pattern observed reﬂects worker heterogeneity more
than it does wage policy. That is, ﬁrms that have more compressed wages
have a more homogeneous workforce, and within that workforce there is
less diﬀerence between the top workers and the median workers. As a re-
sult, top workers are less likely to be underpaid in that environment and
less likely to exit. Overall, we do not ﬁnd evidence that pay compression in
ﬁrms is pushing out more skilled workers. We leave it to future research to
disentangle the relationship between compression and mobility.10
In sum, ﬁrms that allow high wage spread also have higher wages. This
pushes a productivity interpretation: ﬁrms that allow disparate wage treat-
ment also reap the beneﬁt through incentive and selection eﬀects of higher
productivity. Firms that compress wages drive out their best workers 
and stiﬂe incentives to produce. However, workers don’t exit more in com-
pressed wage ﬁrms. Apparently, ﬁrms with compressed wages also have
higher wage levels or lower skill levels. But across all countries, we ﬁnd no
evidence that policies of pay compression are reducing productivity.
The general conclusion from this section is that there is considerable
within-ﬁrm variance in wages in all countries. Although ﬁrms diﬀer con-
siderably within a country, both in terms of average wage and in terms of
wage spread, there is a signiﬁcant amount of variation within each ﬁrm.
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10. Why is pay compression and exit rate negatively correlated? It could be because large
ﬁrms have high exit rates and have high but compressed wages. In these data, exit rates are
lower in large ﬁrms that have compressed wage structures. It could also be because highly





























































































































































































































































































































































































.Some of this reﬂects diﬀerences in workers within each ﬁrm, but some may
reﬂect wage policy. At this point, it is diﬃcult to distinguish, but the wage
compression evidence points more to heterogeneity than to wage policy.
Wage Growth
Alternative views of the sources of wage growth build directly from the
themes developed in the preceding in studying the variation in wage levels
across and within ﬁrms. Imagine ﬁgure I.1 as a picture of the distribution
of wage growth rates rather than wage levels. At one extreme is panel B of
ﬁgure I.1, in which ﬁrms have very diﬀerent mean pay raises. Firm-speciﬁc
diﬀerences in pay raises would arise: when occupational segregation or
skill heterogeneity within ﬁrms causes some ﬁrms to pay high raises in 
response to hot occupational labor markets; when some ﬁrms with a pol-
icy of pay compression pay lower raises due to lower performance; or when
the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm translates into pay diﬀerences through institu-
tions or union bargaining. At the other extreme is panel A of ﬁgure I.1, in
which ﬁrms have extreme heterogeneity of wage growth rates within the
ﬁrm. These within-ﬁrm diﬀerences in wage growth would arise when work-
ers build human capital at diﬀerent rates within their careers in the ﬁrm;
when ﬁrms respond to the external labor market pressures for wage growth
that vary across the occupations within the ﬁrm; when tournaments or 
incentive structures introduce pay raises for eﬀort; or when institutional
seniority-based pay structures vary across occupations.
Raises within and across Firms
The data reveal extensive heterogeneity of wage growth both within each
economy and within most ﬁrms. Within the economy, workers experience
very diﬀerent outcomes: the standard deviation of the growth of log wages
is much larger than the average level of wage growth for most countries (ﬁg-
ure I.10).In most economies, the average growth of wages is 2 to 5 percent,
but the standard deviation of wages is about 10 to 30 percentage points.
Workers in the 90th percentile of wage increases obtained increases in the
range of 15 to 20 percent in most countries (ﬁgure I.A.1). Even when wages
were not growing that rapidly, on average, some workers experienced very
high wage increases. This is an interesting fact and one that could have
been learned from standard panel data sources. The advantage of the new
data is they enable us to look next at how the ﬁrm inﬂuences these wage
changes.
Within the ﬁrm, wage dispersion is also very high. The within-ﬁrm stan-
dard deviation in wage increases is always larger than the mean wage
change and, in many countries, very much larger: mean wage dispersion
ranges from 5 to 15 percentage points (ﬁgure I.11). The within-ﬁrm dis-
persion of wage growth is often about 50 percent of the dispersion of wage
























































































































































































































.growth for the country. But it is often more than twice the mean wage growth
for the ﬁrm. For example, in Denmark, in 2000, average wage growth for the
ﬁrm was 3.4 percent. The within-ﬁrm standard deviation of growth rates
was 8 percent.
Overall, a very interesting pattern emerges. The picture for wage levels is
mirrored and ampliﬁed in wage growth. Figure I.12 is the wage growth
counterpart to ﬁgure I.3 for wage levels. Figure I.12 shows wage growth
distributions for low-wage-growth ﬁrms and high-wage-growth ﬁrms.
France has higher wage growth dispersion than does Norway (according
to these measures). But for all three countries, the ﬁrm is a “microcosm” of
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Fig. I.12 Wage growth distributions for low-wage-growth ﬁrms, median-wage-
growth ﬁrms and high-wage-growth ﬁrms for some typical countries: A, France
1996; B, Norway 1997
Notes:Below 10 refers to the subsample of ﬁrms for which each ﬁrm has its mean wage growth
rate of the ﬁrm below the 10th percentile of the mean wage growth rate of all ﬁrms. Near 50
refers to the subsample of ﬁrms for which each ﬁrm has its mean wage growth rate of the ﬁrm
near the 50th percentile of the mean wage growth rate of all ﬁrms. Above 90 refers to the sub-
sample of ﬁrms for which each ﬁrm has its mean wage growth rate of the ﬁrm above the 90th
percentile of the mean wage growth rate of all ﬁrms. All refers to all ﬁrms.
A
Bthe economy—the dispersion of wage growth within the ﬁrm is strikingly
similar to wage growth across ﬁrms and individuals.
Modeling wage growth introduces a role for business cycles. One com-
mon view of business cycles and economic growth is that when things are
good for some, they are good for all. When the economy is good, wages
grow for the economy as a whole, and every ﬁrm and every worker experi-
ence the same increase in wage growth. In this extreme view, ﬁrms change
wages in lockstep: wages rise or fall at the same rate and same time for all
ﬁrms. At the other extreme, the relevant unit of analysis is the worker and
the state of the economy has little eﬀect on wage growth. Each worker’s an-
nual wage increase is an independent draw from some distribution that is a
function of skills or eﬀort. The ﬁrm wage increase is then an aggregation of
its workers’ increases and the economy as a whole an aggregation of the
ﬁrms’ increases. Of course, neither extreme will be true. But what our data
shows us is that even though mean wage growth varies over time with the
state of the economy, most workers’ wage increases do not move in lock-
step with the state of the economy, but vary widely in every year regardless
of the state of the economy.
The fact that within-ﬁrm variation in wage growth is high suggests a
number of things. First, a rising tide does not lift all boats, at least to the
same extent. Second, the fact that wage growth is quite varied within the
ﬁrm suggests that raises are tied to some other factor, like the outside labor
market. Lazear and Oyer (2004) ﬁnd that occupation is a much more im-
portant determinant of wage growth than is the ﬁrm. At least in Sweden,
workers’ wages are more closely related to their skill set than to their ﬁrms’
fortunes. The same appears to be true of other countries, because the
within-ﬁrm variation in wage growth is so high. High variance of wage
growth within the ﬁrm also suggests high variation in human capital
growth or eﬀort across workers within the ﬁrm.
Firms are diﬀerent, however, in that some ﬁrms have much more of a
lockstep approach to raises than others. Figure I.13 plots the standard de-
viation of the change in log wage for ﬁrms that have very high within-ﬁrm
variation, speciﬁcally are in the 90th percentile of ﬁrms’ standard devia-
tions of the change in the log wage. It does the same for ﬁrms in the 10th
percentile. For example, in 2000 in Finland, the ﬁrms that treated workers
most disparately with respect to raises had a standard deviation of   log
wage equal to .15, whereas those that treated workers most similarly with
respect to raises had a standard deviation of .05. Some ﬁrms have a lock-
step raise policy. What one worker gets as a raise, the other workers get as
well. Other ﬁrms do not have much within-ﬁrm conformity.
One key area for future investigation is whether the standard deviation
of wage changes within the ﬁrm is fairly stable over time. Figure I.13 shows
that it is remarkably constant over time for the country as a whole. Whether
and why the within-ﬁrm standard deviation of raises is stable is an area for

































































































































sfuture research, but a conjecture is that the structure of the ﬁrm remains
relatively constant over time.11 One way of examining this would be to es-
timate ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in the wage growth equation and see if these ﬁrm
eﬀects are ﬁxed over time and whether they contribute equally to the vari-
ance of ﬁrm growth over time.12
Raises and Tenure
Standard in the literature on human capital is that wage growth is more
rapid during the early years of career than during the later years. The av-
erage wage increase is larger for young workers than older workers. This
can come about through a variety of mechanisms. One is that young work-
ers move across more ﬁrms than old workers. The other is that within ﬁrms,
there is a policy to give larger wage increases to young workers than to
older ones. That policy could reﬂect incentive rewards for early eﬀort or
human capital growth. Most academics experience this ﬁrsthand: aca-
demic deans invariably send out a letter each year bemoaning the small
pool available for raises and justifying small senior professor raises by stat-
ing that the pool must be reserved to increase the wages of more junior pro-
fessors. Is this a valid characterization of the typical ﬁrm, and how general
is this policy across ﬁrms and countries?
Figure I.14 shows the diﬀerence between the wage growth rate of high-
tenure workers and low-tenure workers within the ﬁrm, averaged across
ﬁrms in the economy. The diﬀerence is almost always positive, and in some
country years, it is large. Of course, this is wage growth for those who stay
in the ﬁrm. Much of the diﬀerence in wage growth at the individual level
that occurs over the life cycle may work through mobility across ﬁrms.
Young workers who are “stars” also receive considerably higher raises
than older workers who are the stars within the ﬁrm. Taking the diﬀerence
in the wage growth rate among the 90th percentile raises among low-tenure
workers from that of the 90th percentile of high-tenure workers within the
ﬁrm, this diﬀerence is positive and often 2 to 8 percentage points. This sug-
gests more positive skew in the distribution of raises among the young than
among the senior. Some young workers do very well and may be on a fast
track. To ascertain that, it would be necessary to examine the pattern of 
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11. Wage growth dispersion within the ﬁrm should reﬂect the fact that some occupations
enjoy relatively large increases in demand during some years, whereas other occupations en-
joy large demand increases in other years. Although it is not the same occupation that expe-
riences high wage growth over time, it is true that ﬁrms with many occupations are more likely
to have more disparate wage growth than ﬁrms with few occupations. If so, there will be rela-
tive stability in the within-ﬁrm variance in wage growth, even if occupations switch places in
terms of which are treated well or poorly in a given year.
12. Another question is whether ﬁrms that have little wage change also have small variance
in wage change. It has long been known that at the national level, inﬂation and cross-sectional
variation in prices are positively correlated; there is a higher variance of wage growth during
periods of high inﬂation. We have not yet investigated this phenomenon, but it is possible to







































































































































eserial correlation of raises for a given worker over time, which is possible in
these data but left for another study.
Mobility
Exit rates vary substantially across ﬁrms and countries. The typical
ﬁrm’s exit rate varies from lows of around 15 percent in Norway, Sweden,
Finland, and early observations for Germany, to highs of 35 percent in
France. However, we caution against comparing exit-rate levels across
countries for these data. Because the diﬀerent data sets measure exit over
diﬀerent time intervals and types of jobs, exit levels are not comparable.13
Instead, we focus on within-country correlations. For example, in coun-
tries where exit rates are high, entry rates are also high (ﬁgure I.15). This
must be true to provide an equilibrium where approximately the same num-
ber of workers are employed over time.14
Mobility and Wage Levels
There is a negative correlation between both exit and entry rates and
wage levels (ﬁgure I.16). Firms that are high-wage ﬁrms are also low-
turnover ﬁrms. This could reﬂect one of two phenomena. First, high-wage
ﬁrms may pay above the market. Workers queue for jobs in those ﬁrms.
When they ﬁnally land a job in a high-wage ﬁrm, they keep it because their
alternatives are rarely better. Low-wage ﬁrms scrape for workers, lose them
whenever something better comes along, and must have high hiring rates
to compensate for the high quit rates.
An alternative explanation is that high-wage ﬁrms have more skilled
workers, and the turnover rates for the less skilled are higher than those 
for the more highly skilled. Work experience could account for this alone.
A ﬁrm with many high-tenure workers would be expected to have lower
turnover rates than those with low-tenure workers.
A very interesting new fact comes from ﬁgure I.17. Growing ﬁrms tend
to be low-wage ﬁrms. The ﬁrms with the high entry rates also have the low-
est average wages. The pattern holds across countries and over all years but
is stronger in some cases than others. This ﬁnding makes sense. New ﬁrms
are likely to be growing more rapidly than older ﬁrms, and new ﬁrms are
also likely to be smaller than mature ﬁrms. It is also interesting that the pat-
tern holds across countries.
Wage Structure, Raises, and Mobility: Introduction 33
13. For example, exit rates based on monthly data will be much higher than those based on
annual data because one job can have many workers turn over in that job within one year.
14. There are some notable exceptions. Germany, during the early 1990s, had exit rates that
far exceeded entry rates. This invariably reﬂects the reuniﬁcation and fundamental changes in




































































































































































































































































































mMobility and Firm Size
Another related and new fact is that exit rates and entry rates in big ﬁrms
are lower than the exit and entry rates in the average ﬁrms. Figure I.18
shows that the exit rates at big ﬁrms are about 80 to 90 percent of the exit
rates at average ﬁrms. The pattern is strikingly consistent across countries
(with a few exceptions). The same is true of entry rates; there is less hiring
at big ﬁrms and more hiring at small ﬁrms relative to the size of the ﬁrms.
Figure I.19 shows the net entry rate (entry-exit rates) and then taking the
diﬀerence between all ﬁrms and big ﬁrms. There is no consistent pattern.
This neither supports nor rejects Gibrat’s law. In some country years, there
is a pattern of growth being lower in large ﬁrms. In other country years, the
reverse is true. But the diﬀerence is rarely zero, which would be the predic-
tion of Gibrat’s Law. (Given the number of ﬁrms in each subsample, the
diﬀerences shown in ﬁgure I.19 are most likely signiﬁcant in almost all
cases.) Apparently other factors are important in determining the size dis-
tribution of growth rates, and the statement that growth is independent of
ﬁrm size seems to be inaccurate. A more accurate statement is that growth
rates vary with ﬁrm size across time and location. The causal nature re-
mains unknown at least for this study.
The determinants of ﬁrm turnover rates (industry, occupation, wage,
skill, average tenure, etc.) could be investigated. Although we present no
evidence on those factors here, it is possible to perform an analysis of this
sort using the countrywide data sets used in this book.
Firm Mobility and Wage Growth
If the typical labor market allows for some rent sharing between capital
and labor, worker wages should rise when ﬁrm proﬁts rise. It is also rea-
sonable to expect that proﬁts and employment would be positively related.
Firms that are proﬁtable are likely to be doing more net hiring than ﬁrms
that are unproﬁtable. When proﬁts are down, ﬁrms typically cut the size of
their labor force. As a result, good times might be accompanied by super-
normal wage growth and also by supernormal employment growth. The
cross-country data provide evidence on the correlation between wage and
employment policy, and we believe that this is the ﬁrst evidence of this sort
that cuts across many ﬁrms.
Figure I.20 reports that the correlation between wage change and entry
rates tends to be positive. In a given country year, ﬁrms that are raising
wages are also likely to have higher than average entry rates. But ﬁrms that
are raising wages do not consistently (across country years) have lower exit
rates. In the most open countries, like Denmark, the ﬁnding is strong. High
wage growth and low exit rates move together. But in Sweden, the results
are weak and in the opposite direction. This might reﬂect the “dot.com
boom” phenomenon. During the dot.com boom, the typical view was that




















































































































































































































































































































































ethe Silicon Valley labor market was in a talent war. Programmers and other
skilled technical workers moved from ﬁrm to ﬁrm frequently, as demand
shifted to reﬂect the fortunes of one company or another. Firms with rap-
idly growing wages hired many workers, but also lost them to other ﬁrms
with rapidly growing wages because of the nature of industrial structure.
Turnover rates were lower and wages were increasing less rapidly in more
traditional parts of the economy, where the situation was closer to stable.
So exit rates and high wage growth might go together if they characterize
ﬁrms that are in industries that are undergoing rapid change. Again, this is
a question that requires additional evidence, obtainable in these data sets,
but not presented here.
The Structure of Wages: Why Care? Discussion and Summary
Several results in these data have revealed key features of the employ-
ment and wage structure of ﬁrms that were not previously known.
• The general structure of wages is remarkably similar across all coun-
tries. No previous study has had the data on employees within ﬁrms to
assess wage structures across countries.
• The wage dispersion within ﬁrms is nearly as high as the wage disper-
sion overall. The standard deviation of wages within the ﬁrm is about
80 percent of the standard deviation across all workers in the economy
(ﬁgure I.4). In addition, the variance in wage growth rates across indi-
viduals within the ﬁrm is very high. Even when the average raise is 4
percent within the ﬁrm, the top 10 percent of workers will typically re-
ceive increases of 8 percent. Wage levels and raises vary considerably
across workers within the ﬁrm.
• Firms are more similar than they are dissimilar. The standard devia-
tion of mean wages across ﬁrms is only about 20 percent of the aver-
age worker’s wage for the economy (ﬁgure I.5). But ﬁrms are not iden-
tical: the standard deviation of mean wages is about 60 percent of the
standard deviation of all individual wages (ﬁgure I.6).
In sum, most ﬁrms have many diﬀerent jobs within the ﬁrm; wage vari-
ance is high within ﬁrms. But the jobs diﬀer across ﬁrms. Janitorial ﬁrms
have lawyers, but few. Law ﬁrms have janitors, but few. Consequently,
mean wages diﬀer across ﬁrms. Firms are not microcosms of the entire
economy, and yet most ﬁrms do reﬂect a subsample of many of the jobs
done in the economy. Figure I.2 is the more accurate depiction of the
sources of wage variance from within and across ﬁrms; the extremes of
panels A and B of ﬁgure I.1 are not evident in the data. Recalling equation
(1), the variance of wages for the economy combines a high within-ﬁrm
variance and signiﬁcant gaps in mean wages across ﬁrms.
Wage Structure, Raises, and Mobility: Introduction 41What do we learn about wage-setting policies and worker sorting across
ﬁrms? First, there is no evidence of extreme sorting of workers across ﬁrms.
That is, most ﬁrms contain a broad mixture of workers’ skills or eﬀort 
levels within the ﬁrm: wage levels vary greatly within the ﬁrm, and wage
growth rates vary greatly within the ﬁrm. Moreover, an average worker
moving from a low-wage ﬁrm to a high-wage ﬁrm would increase his or her
wages by only about 20 percent. Having said this, one can look at the same
data and reach a diﬀerent conclusion. There are diﬀerences in mean wages
across ﬁrms: law ﬁrms do not pay the same as cleaning-service ﬁrms, and
people do sort by occupation or industry.
Second, there is sorting within the ﬁrm. High-eﬀort or high-skilled
workers are sorted into jobs that pay more within the ﬁrm. High-eﬀort
workers are rewarded with pay increases and are thus sorted into the jobs
where they are the most productive. Again we know this to be true because
there is a high variance of pay levels and pay increases within ﬁrms: ﬁrms
do not have policies of equal pay for all. Instead, what they have is some
combination of heterogeneous teamwork within the ﬁrm, systems of in-
centive pay that reward for eﬀort, and sensitivity of wages to outside mar-
ket conditions for each occupation or individual. Firms are more hierar-
chical than homogeneous. Of course, a law ﬁrm would not be expected to
have the same average wage as a cleaning-service ﬁrm. The diﬀerences in
skill between these two ﬁrms is obvious. There is also likely to be a diﬀer-
ence in wage policy: law ﬁrms may by choice introduce tournament mod-
els; cleaning-service ﬁrms may have compressed wages from unionized
bargaining. It may be possible to distinguish skill heterogeneity if we esti-
mate models with individual speciﬁc and ﬁrm eﬀects; given individual
eﬀects, the residual wage variation across ﬁrms represents policy. We leave
it to future researchers to work on the underlying wage-setting models (ex-
tending the work of Abowd, Kramartz, and Margolis 1989). Why does all
this matter? We highlight three reasons.
One reason to care about within-ﬁrm variation in wages and even more
to the point, worker characteristics, is that it may help us learn about the
nature of the ﬁrm’s production function. One possibility (as shown in panel
B of ﬁgure I.1) is that workers are almost identical within ﬁrm, both in
wages and in characteristics. The need for diﬀerent skills to produce a
product might be handled by the market, say, where low-skilled workers
sell the commodity that they produce to more highly skilled workers who
know how to market and distribute the product. Alternatively, team pro-
duction may make it essential to have many diﬀerent types of workers
within the same ﬁrm. It may be diﬃcult to use the discipline of the market
to supervise workers within one ﬁrm by workers in another ﬁrm. The evi-
dence here is that ﬁrms comprise workers that are more heterogeneous
than homogeneous, but further work should be done.
42 Edward P. Lazear and Kathryn L. ShawSome analysis suggests that ﬁrms are becoming more dissimilar over
time. That is, ﬁrms that specialize in high-end skills are increasingly diﬀer-
ent from ﬁrms that specialize in low-end skills (Kremer and Maskin 1995).
The evidence for this is from regressions with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. In the chap-
ters that estimated wage regressions with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, the ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects are contributing more to the R-squared of the wage regression over
time. Thus, increasingly the ﬁrm matters more: high-wage ﬁrms are select-
ing or rewarding the highest skill. This is an interesting technological
change. Kremer and Maskin (1996b) posit that in recent years ﬁrms re-
quire more skill segregation across ﬁrms as a response to skill-biased tech-
nological change. In all the countries that study this, we have evidence
lending support to this hypothesis. In general, a deeper understanding of
the wage distribution within ﬁrms might give us a clue as to the labor in-
gredients required to produce—how those ingredients vary over time and
among industries—and might shed some light on the nature of team pro-
duction.
The ultimate question is whether wage policy speciﬁcally and labor pol-
icy in general has an eﬀect on productivity. It is conceivable that data of this
type might allow investigation of this issue within countries and among
countries. Within a country, ﬁrms that (randomly) adopt diﬀerent policies
with respect to the types of workers they hire and how they pay them might
experience diﬀerent levels of productivity. For example, some have sug-
gested that ﬁrms that limit the levels of top salaries relative to its median
levels are less productive. Because the unit of analysis is the pay policy of
the ﬁrm, only these employer-employee data can address issues such as
this. By attaching measures of ﬁrm productivity or proﬁtability, or in the
absence of proﬁtability, ﬁrm survival, we may get some hints as to the
eﬀects of various policies. For example, if it were found that ﬁrms with ei-
ther a too compressed or too disparate wage policy were more likely than
ﬁrms in the middle to go out of business, this would be a starting point.
Then an examination of the detailed nature of turnover at those ﬁrms
might shed additional light.
Finally, these data shed new light on workers’ careers. The fact that there
is considerable wage variation within ﬁrm means that, at least potentially,
workers are not locked into a particular wage slot as a function of their ﬁrst
job assignment. If wages were compressed within ﬁrms, mobility would be
necessary to change one’s position, both over the life cycle and relative to
other workers. Luck might play an important role. If a worker landed in a
low-wage ﬁrm like the one pictured at the far left of panel B of ﬁgure I.1,
he or she would have no hope of changing his or her income without leav-
ing the ﬁrm. In an economy where mobility is costly (either as a result of
market forces or government mandated severance pay that makes ﬁrms re-
luctant to hire), young workers who begin in low-wage ﬁrms suﬀer signiﬁ-
Wage Structure, Raises, and Mobility: Introduction 43cant lifetime losses on their human capital. On the other end, those who
start in high-wage ﬁrms experience a windfall. Thus, if ﬁrm eﬀects domi-
nated the market (as in panel B of ﬁgure I.1), then a bad initial “draw” of
one’s ﬁrm has a huge income eﬀect for the rest of the worker’s career.
In this context, if all of the variation in wages within ﬁrms were ac-
counted for by person eﬀects, then there would be constancy over time in a
worker’s position in the ﬁrm, given his or her initial position. Workers care
that their position can improve in the ﬁrm as a result of experience and pro-
motion. If there is no within-ﬁrm residual variation, then the only way for
a worker to improve his or her relative position is to move. Given our evi-
dence on the high levels of variance of individual wage growth rates within
ﬁrms, the data suggests signiﬁcant promotions and little evidence of get-
ting stuck in one position, but further work expanding on these points
would be highly valuable.15
44 Edward P. Lazear and Kathryn L. Shaw
15. One interesting extension is to estimate wage growth models as a function of individual
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